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SYSTEMS.
In the preface to Professor Tyler's edition of Stephen on
Pleading, it is stated that "it is especially important fhat the
students of law be trained in common law practice, and be con-
vinced of its wisdom as a means of administering justice, in
order that as men who influence public opinion they may if pos-
sible, gradually restore common law pleading to its former effi-
ciency in the courts. At all events their training in common
law pleading will enable them, in States where it is established,
to relieve in some measure the administration of justice from
the embarrassments with which it has been environed by codes.
For a knowledge of common law pleading is not only of impor-
tance in States where wisdom has retained it, but also in States
where it has been abolished." While the value of the knowl-
edge thus advocated should always be clearly apparent to those
whose preparatory studies in the law have included the common
law and equity methods, it is by no means as fully recognized by
those whose legal training has been entirely under the code
system. The views of Professor 'Tyler above quoted may be
taken as true at the present time to the extent that the impor-
tance of the common law training still exists as fully as it did
thirty-seven years ago, though not entirely for the reasons then
advanced, and that, to either the student or the practising law-
yer, such training cannot but be beneficial for the reason that,
with but one single exception, it is believed, and aside from
formal and technical requirements, there is no rule reguliating
the substance of pleadings under the codes which is not either
taken directly from the older system, or framed by analogy in
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the application of the same principles. The experience of the
past thirty years has aemonstrated that the codes have by no
means brought about that perfect completeness and simplicity
in all forms of legal procedure hoped for and predicted by their
supporters, and expected, perhaps, during the earlier years of
their adoption. Much has been written by way of judicial
opinion to elucidate and determine what rule of guidance should
be followed under their apparently clear and simple provi:sions,
often with but little effect beyond disposing of the particular
controversy, and not a little has been put forth by text-writers
to the same end, though not always with a full measure of suc-
cess. There has also been some discussion as to the meaning of
certain requirements of the codes which, while apparently plain,
have involved in their application much confusion and doubt.
No one, however, it is believed, has at any recent time denied
the importance, or at least the benefit, of the common law and
equity training to the lawyer practicing under the codes, and it
is the purpose of the writer to endeavor to indicate some of the
points of contact between the earlier and later systems, as well
as the indirect influence exerted by the former in the present-
ment of controversies for judicial determination.
While it is true that under the methods now pursued the law
schools generally place the study of the common law system at
the commencement of the course on pleading, and while lawyers
without a law school training, but whose practice began far
enough back for them to be affected by the older methods,
recognize its importance, it is also true that students to some ex-
tent regard both systems as practically obsolete so far as code
procedure is concerned, and many lawyers, not graduates of any
law school, are not only of the same opinion but often have no
knowledge whatever of either, their studies having been lim-
ited to the acquisition of such of the provisions of the particular
act as would enable them to obtain admission to the bar and
thereupon "hang out a shingle." It is not intended to make any
general criticism upon the members of the profession, but in
noticing the course of trials of civil causes in courts proceeding
under the codes, it will often be evident that the pleadings in
the different suits have apparently been drawn with a main
object of economizing both time and labor, and with but slight
attempts toward any logical or concise method of statement.
So true is this at times that it would seem as if the end in view
had been to reverse the cardinal principle that the pleading
should be framed for the proper information of the defendant
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as to the case to be established against him in evidence, and
instead of thus informing him to mislead and confuse him to
such an extent as to render him helpless when actually con-
fronted by the testimony at the trial. The method of statement
followed (I refer only to the statement of the facts constituting
either claim or defense, and not to formal or technical allega-
tions) is but too often a statement of "facts" as prescribed by
the codes, made as the lamented Charles O'Conor expressed it,
"just as any old woman, in trouble for the first time, would nar-
rate her grievances," licked into a semblance of orderly shape
by reference to some book of so-called "forms" or to the results
of the labor of a brother practitioner, and telling the opposing
party much more or less than he requires and is entitled, for the
purposes of his defense, to know. In other cases the method
adopted consists of a mixture of the necessary "facts" or, as
convenient, the evidence of such facts, and a series of legal con-
clusions presented in perfect good faith as convincing and ulti-
mate facts, interwoven with such argument or explanation as
seems necessary to complete and solidify the whole; and in still
others, a form is taken bodily, chiefly because it is offered and
labelled as appropriate by some compiler who is assumed to
know, and used in blissful ignorance as to why its formal and
jurisdictional allegations are retained in one case and not in the
other, or whether they fit the particular case at all. The result
of these careless or inefficient methods must always be the
same. The adversary is not thought of save to be misled or
mystified; the actual evidence by which the pleading is to be
sustained and of which it is supposed to present the ultimate
facts, is often lost sight of or slighted for some sweeping juris-
dictional allegation or some graceful period; and last, but not
least, the court is saddled with the extra labor of rescuing from
the mass of chaff and useless repetition, the real issues to be
disposed of.
The causes of the conditions I have mentioned seem to rest
in two things. One is a reliance on the code alone, either from
a want of knowledge of the principles and rules of the older sys-
tems, or from a disregard of such knowledge if already acquired;
while the other and perhaps the most important, lies in the diffi-
culty of complying with the common directions of the codes that
the'complaint or petition must contain a plain and concise state-
ment of the facts constituting the cause of action, without un-
necessary repetition, but not the evidence of such facts. As to
the cause first mentioned, it is of course true that both students
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and lawyers will be responsible, each to himself only, for any
failure to profit by a sufficient training in this branch of legal
procedure, and it is no less true that many have regarded and
will continue to treat the common law and equity systems as of
no immediate importance in code practice, and to be examined
only in connection with controversies in the Federal courts, or,
possibly, in a State court having a common law or chancery juris-
diction. It is to such, as well as to those to be next referred to,
that the suggestions of this article seem proper, and to such
they are commended.
The second cause before mentioned, is one which has been
fruitful in the refinements and discussion it has caused, inas-
much as the requirement of the practice acts that the pleader
shall allege facts and at the same time not plead evidence, has
often compelled lawyers, in their anxiety to so frame their plead-
ings as to remain in court and at the same time fully set forth
the cause of action they advocated, to present a series of state-
ments of fact, covering all possible grounds directly or indirectly
connected with their case, in order to avoid the consequences of
a variance between pleading and proof in the event of strict rul-
ings by the court as to the issues involved. Probably more of
the bad pleading that may be noticed arises from this than from
any other cause; and the provisions of the codes directing that
pleadings be liberally construed, while sometimes effective to
relieve one from the consequences of carelessness or ignorance,
are by no means to be relied on to help out any serious errors or
omissions in the statement of the substance of either cause of
action or defense. This requirement as to stating facts seems to
have been about the only really new departure, in framing
the codes, from what was before required, and was characterized
by Mr. O'Conor as "an attempt at an absolute impossibility in
prescribing the rule of pleading," substantially and in effect
prohibiting the statement of conclusions in law or in reason
from the facts of the case, and at the same time forbidding the
statement of the evidence tending to prove such facts. Accord-
ing to the decisions interpreting these provisions, the facts
referred to in the statute are "physical facts" (whatever that
may mean in a legal sense), and those which the evidence to be
offered at the trial will prove-not the evidence required to
prove the existence of such facts. And it has been also held
that the facts in question are in general such as were required to
be stated in pleadings at common law-that is, issuable and
material facts, essential to the cause of action or defense, and
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not those detailed and minute circumstances which may go to
establish such issuable facts. As to the exact meaning of this
requirement of the codes, there has been and may continue to
be some confusion, the interpretation given being often con-
trolled by the nature of the case (as shown by the different
methods of alleging fraud and negligence), or perhaps, by the
tendency of the court toward strictness or liberality in applying
the proper rules of construction. The rule against pleading evi-
dence, moreover, is not an original code rule, so to speak, but
one taken from the common law, and also recognized under the
equity system except where the complainant's allegations are
framed with the object of obtaining a discovery from the de-
fendant. The difficulty lies in its application to particular cases,
the ultimate facts to be stated being often really conclusions of
law or fact that are not readily distinguishable as such. It
would be beyond the limits of this article to enter into any com-
parison of the decisions on this point, and perhaps the best sum-
mary of the situation may be made by taking the statement that
"some latitude of interpretation is to be given to the term
'facts' when used in a rule of pleading. It must of necessity
embrace a class of mixed facts in which more or less of legal
inference is admitted," with that of the court, in an early New
York case, that the facts required by the codes to be stated in
pleading are in general the issuable and material facts required
to be stated at common law-that is, that in a legal action under
the codes the facts constituting the cause of action must be at
least what the common law procedure would have required; and
in a suit for equitable relief the same facts would be necessary
as in a bill in equity for relief under the older chancery system.
But however the provisions in question may be construed, it is
certainly not to be greatly wondered at that, in view of the
uncertainty as to what is actually required, and the consequent
fear of being thrown out of court on a demurrer, or subjected to
the consequences of a variance at the trial, lawyers should often
seek to place their causes on safe ground by so extending and
broadening their statements of fact as to enable them, under the
rules of construction applicable, to maintain their standing in
court upon the evidence they are finally able to present.
It is not the purpose of this article to advance the theory
that a knowledge of the early methods and rules of pleading
will afford any specific or immediate remedy for the faults
already referred to, or prevent the consequences of carelessness
or willful neglect, but there can be little doubt that such know.
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ledge, valuable in any case from a historical standpoint, is much
more so in giving a familiarity with the sources from which the
principles, at least, of our present code procedure were derived
and consequently with the reason why allegations in common
use are made. The codes have abolished the older forms of pro-
cedure, substituting a single form of action for all controversies,
whether legal or equitable, and the formal and technical por-
tions of the older method are therefore of no further importance
in this connection, particularly the fictitious allegations as to
venue and the taking in trover and conversion, and the well-
known "common counts" are no longer used as formerly,
though still, it seems, available. It will, therefore, only be
necessary to examine the rules as to the substantial allegations
of the pleadings, both now and formerly in force, and note the
relation between them and the extent to which the older rules,
or the principles upon which they rest, are active in the struc-
ture of pleadings under the codes.
'raking the rules stated as effective in connection with code
pleading, let us first examine, as the natural order, those deter-
mining what facts must not be given in the statement of the
cause of action, in either complaint or petition. Five rules have
been here laid down by Mr. Bliss, covering presumptions of law
and of fact, matters judicially noticed, anticipating defenses, and
pleading evidence, conclusions of law, or immaterial or irrele-
vant matters. In each instance we find th6 rule as given is prac-
tically a re-statement of that in force under the common law
system, and the supporting principle is in each case the same.
Thus, facts which the law presumes, as the absence of criminal
and improper motives in acts done, or the proper. and lawful
conduct of all men in their business, need not be alleged, and
the same is true of facts which the law will necessarily imply
from the existence of other facts. So the allegation of matters
of which the court takes judicial notice, as the laws of nations,
public statutes or treaties, or matters of general notoriety, etc.,
is not required, nor is the plaintiff allowed to anticipate a de-
fense by stating facts wliich would more properly come from the
other side, nor to plead evidence which should be presented only
at the trial. He is also prohibited from stating conclusions of
law, or encumbering his pleading with matter that is irrelevant
and immaterial to the issues to be examined. These rules are
all to be found in the common law system, though perhaps not
wholly in the same words, and also, for the most part, in that of
the courts of chancery, although, as we have seen, the rule as to
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pleading evidence does not apply in equity as to allegations of
the bill which are framed to obtain a discovery.
Again, taking the code rules as to the facts to be stated, we
find first the substance of the common law rule that the pleadings
must show title or authority, and in another rule, viz., that "in
actions on contract the complaint must show privity," a re-
affirmance of the common law principle that privity, where
essential to the right of action, must be shown, as well as of the
requirement of the equity system that the bill must show a rela-
tion between the parties giving the complainant the right to
relief in the particular suit against the defendant named.
So the rule that "in actions on contract, consideration must be
shown," follows directly upon the requirements of the older
systems, and that providing that in seeking relief other than by
a judgment for money or specific property it must appear that
such judgment could not be obtained, is substantially another
mode of stating the chancery rule that in order to obtain equita-
ble relief, the complainant's bill must show, on its face, a title
or equity to the relief sought. A further rule, that as to per-
sons suing or being sued in a representative capacity, the
authority or relation must be shown, is also the application of a
principle embodied in the common law rule as to showing title,
and the other rules as to certainty and materiality. In regard to
corporations, however, there does uot seem to have been any
positive requirement under either the common law or equity
systems, independent of statute, that any allegation should be
made as to the legal existence of a corporation, it being re-
garded as an individual, and suing or defending in its corporate
name in the same manner. With this exception, all the rules
laid down by Mr. Bliss as to the facts to be stated or omitted are
the counterpart of those followed in common law procedure, or
are framed by analogy in the application of the same principles,
and in these are included all rules of the common law or equity
systems under this head, not referable to technicalities or formal
Tequirements which the change to the single form of action has
swept away.
Turning now to the rules as to the manner of stating facts,
the first of the common law requirements which need be men-
tioned is that forbidding duplicity, and in connection with this
may be taken the equity rule against multifariousness in the
improper joinder of different grounds for relief in the same bill.
While the practice acts generally permit several distinct and
independent causes of action, legal or equitable, to be joined in
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the same complaint or petition, if arising out of the same trans-
action or series of transactions and between the same parties,
the principles of the common law and of the later equity rules
are clearly applicable, and the causes .of action thus stated must
each, as in the case of a single statement, be complete in itself,
and not embrace distinct and inconsistent grounds for complaint
or relief. The four subordinate rules given by Mr. Stephen as
exceptions or qualifications to the general rule as to duplicity,
are also fully applicable, being rules of substance entirely. Thus,
matter which of itself renders a pleading double will have the
same effect, though ill pleaded, while immaterial matter or mat-
ter of inducement will not cause the fault, nor will a series of
detailed facts if establishing but a single point or proposition.
Again, the rules of the common law as to certainty, both
principal and subordinate, are applied to their full extent in
code pleading, except where the framers of the statute, for the
s,ike of simplicity or brevity, have provided for a special
method of statement. Thus, time (not the fictitious venue of
the common law) and place, whenever material, are to be stated
as at common law, and, as we have already seen, the rule as to
showing title is also enforced. Items of quantity, quality and
value, whenever material to the issue, 'must be truly stated, and
both persons and property described with sufficient certainty for
purposes of identification, accuracy being especially necessary
in the case of real property. Of the subordinate rules, those re-
lating to pleading evidence, or matters judicially noticed, or
anticipating the defense, or stating presumptions of law ot fact,
have already been noticed. All are as fully applicable under
the codes as at common law or under the equity system, and not
less so are the further rules that no greater certainty is required
than the nature of the thing pleaded will conveniently admit of,
and that less particularity is required in the statement of matter
of inducement, or where the facts lie more in the knowledge of
the opposing party. So, also, the rule that acts valid at com-
mon law, but regulated by a subsequent statute, are to be
pleaded the same as before the statute, is still in force.
Taking, further, the common law rules as to consistency and
simplicity, as well as directness and brevity, the code -system
recognizes and applies those forbidding inconsistency, repug-
nancy, ambiguity, argumentativeness, and alternative or hypo-
thetical pleading, and indirect recitals, as well as that provid-
ing that matters are to be pleaded'according to their legal opera-
4ion and effect, though the latter is modified in being made
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optional with the pleader. Departure is also prohibited and sur-
plusage is condemned, though the liberal rules of practice gen-
erally allow the objectionable matter to be stricken out. Other
rules might be mentioned, but as they relate to technical mat-
ters connected with .the older forms and theories, they have no
place in the code system. In the enumeration already given we
have covered, though somewhat imperfectly, all rules of the
common law system which related to and controlled the substan-
tial statement of the cause of action, nearly all of which are
also fully applicable to the system of pleading in equity. It
may be added, also, that while the codes are more specific as to
the form and contents of the answer, the substance or facts of
any defense or counterclaim as well as of any new matter in a
reply, should be presented under the same rules of statement as
the facts constituting a cause of action.
The foregoing review of the relations between the old and
new systems as to the structure of pleadings, has necessarily
been too brief for that illustration by decisions which gives the
best and most intelligible explanation, but if its suggestions are
accepted by any student, or influence any lawyer to turn to the
older method for aid in the preparation of his pleadings under
the new, the result aimed at will have been accomplished.
Much has been written in elaborate explanation of the theory
and application of the general provisions of the code as to plead-
ing and practice, and most if not all the text-writers have to a
greater or less extent recognized and explained the application
of common law and equity rules and principles. All have been
obliged to assume, however, that the student or practitioner
was familiar with the older methods, and it has been for a long
time the belief of the writer that no harm could result from
emphasizing the teaching of the law schools, by a few sugges.
tions as to preparing pleadings with reference to the reasons
underlying the rules upon which the different allegations are
founded. It will often be found that, where the statute is
silent, doubt as to the necessity. or propriety of particular alle-
gations will disappear upon an examination of the reason of the
common law rule in similar cases, and I feel safe in asserting
that if any lawyer will frame his allegations of fact, in a com.
plaint or petition under the codes, to fully comply with the
requirements of the common law or equity methods in a like
case, he need fear no demurrer, provided the statute does not
dictate the form of procedure.
Finally, I cannot better close this article than by the words
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of the late Professor Cooley, which though written many years
ago, seem to be fully applicable to the conditions of to-day:
"The works of common law pleading have not been superseded
by the new codes which have been introduced. * * * A
careful study of these works is the very best preparation for the
pleader, as well where a code is in force as where the old com-
mon law forms are still adhered to. Any expectation which
may have existed that the code was to banish technicality, and
substitute such simplicity that any man of common understand-
ing was to be competent, without legal training, to present his
case in due form of law, has not been realized. After a trial of
the code system for many years, its friends must confess that
there-is something more than form in the old system'of plead-
ing, and that the lawyer who has learned to state his case in a
logical manner after the rules laid down by Stephen and Gould,
is better prepared to draw a pleading that will stand the test on
demurrer than the man who, without that training, undertakes
to tell his story to the court as he might tell it to a neighbor,
but who, never having accustomed himself to a strict and logi-
cal presentation of the precise facts which constitute the legal
cause of action or the legal defense, is in danger of stating so
much or so little, or of presenting the facts so inaccurately, as
to leave his rights in doubt on his own showing. Let the com-
mon law rules be mastered, and the work under the codes will
prove easy and simple, and it will speedily be seen that no time
has been lost or labor wasted, in coming to the new practice
by the old road."
Benjamin J. Shoman.
ST. PAUL, February 3d, 1898.
